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Learning cues to category membership: Patterns in children’s ac-
quisition of hedges
MARISA CASILLAS AND PATRI´CIA AMARAL
Stanford University and University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Introduction
When we think of children acquiring language, we often think of their acquisition
of linguistic structure as separate from their acquisition of knowledge about the
world. But it is clear that in the process of learning about language, children con-
sult what they know about the world; and that in learning about the world, children
use linguistic cues to discover how items are related to one another. This interac-
tion between the acquisition of linguistic structure and the acquisition of category
structure is especially clear in word learning.
0.1 Linguistic Hedges and Category Membership
In order to refer to items in the world, speakers must know about the relations be-
tween them: their category structure. An item’s category membership is perceived
as gradient rather than absolute. Members of semantic categories have different de-
grees of prototypicality, according to their properties (e.g. Rosch & Mervis 1975).
For example, while native speakers might regard a robin as a good instance of the
category BIRD, they are likely to see a chicken as a more peripheral member of that
category. In language learning, it has been proposed by Heider (1971) that central
members of a category are learned earlier than peripheral members.
Linguistic hedges provide the hearer with information about an item’s position
with respect to the structure of a category. For example, hedges like par excel-
lence or a typical X require the highest degree of category membership, while other
hedges (e.g. kind of, sort of, and almost) encode vagueness or fuzziness in mem-
bership (Lakoff 1973). The interpretations of sort of and almost both involve iden-
tifying central and peripheral members of a category, though their meanings differ.
The use of sort of in (1) indicates that although a croissant can be considered a
dessert, it is not the best instance of this category. The use of almost in (2) indicates
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that the necklace being referred to is not a rainbow, but strongly resembles a typical
rainbow, e.g. due to the number of colors it has, or the overall configuration of its
strands.
(1) A croissant is sort of a dessert.
(2) That necklace is almost a rainbow.
Typically, the meaning of almost involves an ordering. To interpret a sentence
with almost, the hearer must identify a set of ordered elements along a certain di-
mension, i.e. a scale (Hitzeman 1992; Amaral & Del Prete 2010). In (2), under
the interpretation above, almost operates on a prototypicality scale, on which we
rank possible arrangements of colored lines with respect to how well they resem-
ble a “good” rainbow (the most prototypical one). Another interpretation for (2) is
available, namely one that relies on a temporal scale: (2) could also be uttered as a
description of an incomplete necklace that is not a (full) rainbow yet, but will even-
tually become one, once e.g. its blue and violet beads are added. The succession of
steps ending in the fabrication of a full rainbow necklace is what underlies this use
of almost.
The use of these expressions shows that speakers make a range of subtle dis-
tinctions within the structure of semantic categories. Learning about similarities
and differences between items, and identifying properties associated with a certain
category are important skills for the language learner in dealing with vagueness (a
property of all natural languages). Semantic categories have fuzzy boundaries, and
this is part of the semantic knowledge of adult native speakers. If children are sen-
sitive to the meaning of linguistic hedges, their notions about category structure can
be informed by the use of these expressions in the linguistic signal.
0.2 Hedges in Language Acquisition
Previous work on the acquisition of almost has shown that children are sensitive
to the different scales required by its semantics. They use this knowledge to learn
about distinctions in the semantics of different types of gradable adjectives (Syrett
2007). In a corpus study of Child Directed Speech to four children, almost system-
atically occurs as a modifier of expressions involving an ordering on some domain,
often as a modifier of expressions denoting endpoints of temporal paths, like “be-
coming a man” as in (3):
(3) A: Do men have to shave, and boys, too?
M: Boys when they’re almost men, not little boys like you. (Adam, file 38;
Syrett 2007:153)
Almost also operates on a prototypicality scale, sometimes co-occurring with like:
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(4) M: Tell me what color the bookcase is.
N: Red.
M: Almost. It’s pink. (Nina, file 17; Syrett 2007:153)
(5) E: This is almost like tapioca. (Eve, file 7; Syrett 2007:153)
Other uses of almost as a hedge presuppose an awareness of category structure
and the identification of properties associated with a certain category:
(6) A: Look this is almost a beehive it gots little holes. (Abe, 3;10.14)
In a comprehension study on the acquisition of almost by 3- to 5-year-olds,
Amaral (2010) shows that children understand the meaning of almost when they
grasp the underlying scale required by the meaning of the adverb. For example, 3-
year-old children understand an expression of the type ‘almost X’ about 60% of the
time when almost operates on a numeric scale (e.g. He has almost 5 blocks) or on a
directional spatial path (e.g. The frog jumped almost to the lily pad). A consistent,
adult-like interpretation of the adverb as a modifier of different syntactic categories
seems to be reached only at age five (Amaral 2010).
To our knowledge no study has focused on the acquisition of almost or other
expressions as hedges, which encode information about degrees of category mem-
bership. Adults use hedges when offering children information about categories
(e.g. “A moth is sort of a butterfly, but...”), and in that context, the hedged descrip-
tion introduces a new word-referent pair by building on existing knowledge. The
child who understands the meaning of the hedge phrase sort of is invited to make
the inference that the object in question shares some properties with butterflies but
is not, strictly speaking, a butterfly.
Little is known about the acquisition of hedges and their role in word learning,
and yet learning about differences between members of a category is important in
mapping words to their referents. This study investigates whether children are sen-
sitive to the use of the linguistic hedges sort of and almost and, if so, whether they
associate these hedges to non-prototypical members of a category or incomplete
objects/objects-to-be.
We ask the following questions:
1. Are children sensitive to the use of hedges by other speakers?
2. Do children associate hedges to objects that are incomplete or to non-
prototypical category members?
3. Are children sensitive to differences in meaning among hedges?
Our results indicate that from age three children can identify the use of a hedge
by another speaker, and by age five they can reliably use this information to distin-
guish between more and less prototypical members of a category. The structure of
the paper is as follows: In section 1 we present our experiment. Section 2 describes
the results and section 3 presents a discussion of our results and future work.
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1 The Experiment
Our participants were 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children, all native English speakers.
We collected data from twelve participants in each age group for a total of 36 chil-
dren.
1.1 The Task
Participants took part in a four-alternative forced choice task that lasted approx-
imately 10–15 minutes and comprised a total of 12 trials (4 fillers and 8 critical
trials). At the beginning of each trial, the participant was given a set of four se-
mantically related pictures to look at. Two of the pictures were competitors for a
category, one prototypical member and a non-prototypical member (e.g. “butterfly”
and “moth” for the category BUTTERFLY), and the two other pictures were seman-
tically related non-competitors (e.g. “bee” and “mantis”). After the children had a
moment to look at each picture, they were told that a copy of one of the pictures
would be hidden inside of a Mystery Box, and were asked to close or avert their eyes
while the experimenter hid the picture inside. Then a puppet was allowed to peek
inside the box and give the children a clue about which picture was hidden. Fol-
lowing the puppet’s clue, children were asked to point to which of the four pictures
they thought was most likely to be hidden. Sessions were recorded on a camcorder
for later review and coding.
1.2 Manipulations
1.2.1 Use of Hedge
Knowledge of hedges was tested through the clue that the puppet gave. Clues took
the form of a linguistic frame, in which the noun phrase always occurred utterance-
finally. In the 8 critical trials, which all featured competing pictures (e.g. “butterfly”
and “moth”), the puppet used both hedged and unhedged frames (see Table 1): “It’s
almost a ,” “It’s sort of a ,” “It’s a ,” and “In here there’s a .” This
last frame (“Long unhedged”) was added to match the syllable length of the hedged
frames, while leaving the unhedged category label in utterance-final position. Clues
were played through a small speaker inserted inside of the puppet’s head so that
each participant heard the same acoustic signal.
Because we are interested in the children’s knowledge of hedge phrases them-
selves, and not in (related) cues to uncertainty such as pausing, filler usage, in-
tonation, or lengthening, the recordings of the frames were made with a confi-
dent declarative tone and their acoustic properties were kept constant across all the
frames. These other cues to uncertainty or hedging are most likely relevant to word
learning in the same way that the hedge phrases are, but we do not look into them
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Figure 1: Experimental setup: Participants were given a four-picture set to review. A copy of one
picture was hidden by the experimenter in the “Mystery Box.” Children were asked to guess which
picture was hidden after hearing a verbal clue from the puppet, who had peeked into the box.
Table 1: Clue “frames” used by the puppet. Each frame appeared twice on critical trials. Filler
trials only used the Default frame.
Unhedged frames Hedged frames
Default: It’s [a butterfly]. Almost: It’s almost [a butterfly].
Long: In here there’s [a butterfly]. Sort of: It’s sort of [a butterfly].
here. Previous work on children’s perceptions of speaker reliability has demon-
strated that children are highly sensitive to these cues (Koenig & Harris 2005; Sab-
bagh & Baldwin 2001), but little work has tried to control what factors are actually
contributing to these perceptions.
Our prediction is that, if children understand the meaning of sort of and almost,
then they will be more likely to choose the non-prototypical competitor when they
hear a hedged frame in the clue. In the case that they hear an unhedged frame, they
should be more likely to choose the prototypical competitor.
Further, we predict that there will be a developmental effect of the interpretation
of hedges. Namely, that younger children will show a strong prototypicality bias,
more often choosing the prototypical competitor in response to a hedged frame.
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1.2.2 Prototypicality vs. Completeness
As we said above, almost may operate both on a prototypicality and on a temporal
scale, while sort of only denotes fuzziness of membership related to prototypicality.
When describing a moth that strongly resembles a butterfly, we may say It’s almost
a butterfly, relying on a scale of prototypicality. We might also indicate the relation
of a moth to a butterfly by saying It’s sort of a butterfly: although a moth is not a
good exemplar of the category BUTTERFLY, it shares certain significant properties
with a prototypical one (e.g. having wings). On the other hand, if we want to refer
to the life cycle of a butterfly, in which there is a temporal path culminating in the
transition to a winged form, a fully mature larva breaking out of its cocoon can
be described as almost a butterfly. But this interpretation is not available to the
expression sort of a butterfly.
Children may perform differently on these different dimensions of category
membership, and so we decided to test them separately. In the following, we refer
to these dimensions by the terms Prototypicality and Completeness.1 In the Proto-
typicality condition, the two competitors differed with respect to degree of category
centrality. For each category, a picture of a good exemplar and a peripheral ex-
emplar were both provided (e.g. butterfly/moth, sock/Christmas stocking). In the
Completeness condition, competitors were related on a temporal scale, one picture
representing the fully grown or complete exemplar and the other an object-to-be or
an incomplete version of the object (e.g. butterfly/cocoon, sock/partially knit sock).
The possible competing pictures for the category BUTTERFLY are shown in Figure
2.
Each participant was assigned to one of two between-subject conditions: Pro-
totypicality or Completeness. Participants were split evenly within age groups so
that each condition had a total of 18 participants. If children have acquired the
difference in meaning between the two hedges, we predict that they will show a
benefit for their comprehension of sort of on the Prototypicality condition and a
benefit for almost on the Completeness condition. While sort of an X describes a
non-prototypical member of category X, almost an X may indicate either that the
described item resembles a prototypical member of category X or that it is an in-
complete X/an X-to-be. The fact that the latter instances are more frequent in corpus
data leads us to expect that almost be more readily understood in the Completeness
condition.
1 This is a general term that we chose to refer to the temporal scale that can be involved in the
meaning of almost.

Patterns in children’s acquisition of hedges
Figure 2: The prototypical, non-prototypical, and incomplete stimuli for the category BUTTERFLY
used as competitors in the picture sets. Each participant only saw either Prototypicality relations
or Pompleteness relations. The other seven categories were: TREE, FROG, ROOSTER, SANDWICH,
CASTLE, SOCK, and DOLL.
1.2.3 Man-made and Natural Kinds
The critical item categories were grouped into man-made (SANDWICH, CASTLE,
SOCK, and DOLL) and natural kinds (BUTTERFLY, TREE, FROG, and ROOSTER).
The man-made and natural kinds distinction was included to avoid any possible
bias associated to differing knowledge of, or attention to attributes across these two
category types. For example, a child who is not aware that a tadpole will become a
frog will not be well-equipped to respond to the clue It’s almost a frog. That same
child, however, may find the clue It’s almost a sandwich easy to respond to, since
she is familiar with the process of sandwich-making. Thus, in addition to making
our categories as familiar and culturally appropriate as possible, the man-made vs.
natural kinds distinction allows us to ensure that children’s behavior wasn’t limited
to a single category type.
A second reason for this manipulation comes from previous studies on word
learning. Andersen (1975) provides evidence for a developmental trend in the ac-
quisition of vague category boundaries within the semantic field of artifacts. In her
study, young children (around age 3) tend to rely on salient perceptual properties
of objects to make decisions about category membership. Only later do children
combine these physical properties with functional properties as criteria for drawing
category boundaries. In another study also focusing on labels for artifacts, it was
found that in naming contexts, categorization by function is more likely only in
older preschool children, at least 4-year-olds (Kemler Nelson et al. 2000).
Given that functional properties only apply to man-made objects, the inclusion
of both man-made and natural kinds would allow us to see if the integration of
functional properties creates any bias in learning the category structure of man-
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made items. If older preschool children take into account functional properties in
their decisions about categorization, this may play a role in identifying prototypical
and non-prototypical members of man-made categories.
Returning to the Completeness condition, on a temporal scale, a picture of a
chick fulfills the description “It’s almost a rooster” better than a picture of a rooster.
But, this is not the case with the description “It’s sort of a rooster,” in which the best
option (rooster or chick) is less clear, and adults may even be more likely to choose
the rooster, despite the use of a hedge. This distinction between the meanings of
almost and sort of applies more weakly to the man-made items: a picture of a sock
in the process of being knit is a better answer than a prototypical sock whether the
clue is, “It’s almost a sock” or “It’s sort of a sock.” If children are picking up on the
subtle differences in meaning between these hedges, it should be evident in their
differential responses in the Completeness condition, and may even be stronger for
natural kinds than man-made objects.
Since there were only 12 trials, randomization was constrained to keep the man-
made and natural kind trials evenly spread throughout the session. The order of tri-
als was shuffled for each participant so that fillers were dispersed evenly throughout
the 12 trials, starting at the first trial. The placement of images in the 2×2 picture
sets were randomized for each trial, with the caveat that the competitors always
appeared diagonal from each other (not in the same row or column).
Figure 3: Response averages to hedged frames by age group. Age-collapsed response averages to
the default (unhedged) frame is added on the right for comparison. Children in all three age-groups
consistently chose the prototypical item in response to the default frame.
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2 Results
Children and adults were at or near ceiling on the Default frame trials, almost al-
ways choosing the prototypical competitor in response to a clue like It’s a butterfly.
The effect of hedge was significant (p<0.05), meaning that overall, children and
adults were significantly more likely to choose the non-prototypical or incomplete
competitor in response to a hedged frame. From Figure 3, it is clear that though
this effect holds for all age groups of children, there is a strong developmental ef-
fect. Three-year-olds take the hedge phrase into account in their responses, but only
about 25% of the time. Five-year-olds, on the other hand, are much more likely to
treat the hedge phrase in an adult-like way (about 70% of the time). T-tests indicate
a significant difference between 3- to 4-year-olds and 5-year-olds (p<0.05), but no
difference between 3- and 4-year-olds. This suggests that the 4–5 year age span is
an important developmental time for the acquisition of the meaning of hedges.
A mixed-effects model was fit to analyze the effects of the separate manipula-
tions: age, use of hedge, “type of frame”, Prototypicality vs. Completeness, and
Man-made vs. Natural kinds. In addition to a significant effect of age (by year
and age in months), there was a significant interaction between age and frame, and
age and the Long unhedged frame. These interactions stem from two results. First,
performance with almost was slightly better than with sort of, though the effect is
not a significant one. Second, and primarily, children treated the Default unhedged
frame and the Long unhedged frame differently.
Some children appear to use the length of the frame (e.g. in syllables) as a
cue to modification, corresponding in this case to non-prototypicality of the cat-
egory member. For them, longer-than-expected descriptions are less likely to ap-
ply to typical category members, falling in line with Gricean maxims of Manner
and Quantity. This behavioral pattern was most common among 3-year-olds, who
show a marginal difference (p=.08) between the Long and (short) Default unhedged
frames.
While responding to each trial, children were encouraged to share any com-
ments they had about the set of pictures or their reasoning for selecting one over the
others. These data allow us to peek beyond their forced-choice responses, giving
us a richer interpretation of their behavior. The video recording of each child’s par-
ticipation was reviewed by two paid, naive coders who transcribed the children’s
spontaneous commentary, any hesitation in their response (in comparison to the
easier filler trials), and any coping strategies the children used in approaching the
task.2 In this paper, we will not address these coping strategies, but leave a more
in-depth analysis of these behaviors for a later date.
2 E.g. choosing two pictures that might both be valid answers. In these cases, children were re-
minded that they could only choose one picture.
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Figure 4: Comparison of the two unhedged frames.
2.1 Spontaneous Commentary and Hesitations
From their forced-choice response data alone, we cannot tell whether children are
more likely to choose non-prototypical category members in response to hedged
frames because (1) the hedged frames are longer, and so the Gricean inference
applies to all but the Default frame, or (2) the hedged frames contain a hedge phrase,
or (3) both. Here the children’s spontaneous commentary provides a great deal of
insight about how they interpreted the use of hedges. Children’s explanations and
commentary often focused on the lexicalized hedge phrase itself or the category
features it brought to light:
About the hedge:
1. He didn’t say it was a sock, he said it was sort of a sock.
2. He told me it’s sort of like a rooster.
3. Sort of a castle? Because it has the same top as a castle. It’s almost a castle but it’s just one
big tower.
About category features:
1. It was something like a butterfly. This is like a butterfly, it has wings.
2. It’s not big, it doesn’t have a tail. The grownup [rooster] and the baby [chick].
3. Almost a frog... It’s green like a frog, it has feet like a frog.
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Although there were no significant differences between the two hedges in this
task, in the Completeness condition children’s comments on the frame “It’s almost
a .” were revealing. Children refer to temporal paths to explain their choice of
the incomplete or object-to-be competitor:
About temporal paths:
1. Because this tadpole will grow into a frog it’s almost a frog.
2. Oh it’s almost a sock but not a sock yet; because it’s not a sock it’s knitted.
3. When butterflies are in cocoons they turn into this. Butterflies aren’t in cocoons.
Coder reliability for the presence of hesitation compared to filler trials was
75.5%. Taking only those trials which both coders marked as a “hesitated” re-
sponse, we found that participants hesitated on 54% of hedged trials and 12% of
unhedged trials. Over two-thirds of the hesitations on unhedged trials were in re-
sponse to the Long unhedged frame, and the rest were dispersed evenly.
Table 2: Comparing results from the forced-choice responses and children’s hesitations, it becomes
clear that 4-year-olds fall into an intermediate category in which they superficially look like 3-year-
olds, but appear to incur processing costs when presenting with a hedge, like 5-year-olds.
Response measure 3-year-olds 4-year-olds 5-year-olds
“Prototypical” response to hedged frames 77.1% 68.8% ∗ 37.5%
Hesitations during response 36.2% ∗ 59.6% 64.0%
The forced-choice response data showed 5-year-olds diverging from 3- and 4-
year-olds in their use of hedged phrases to select non-prototypical options. This
suggests that four-year-olds have not yet advanced in their knowledge of hedges
from their performance at three years of age. However, when we compare hesitation
data, as in Table 2, we see that 4- and 5-year-olds both diverge from 3-year-olds,
hesitating more often in response to the prompts.
The increase in hesitation with age indicates that the older children are more
likely to take their time to process all of the information given in the frame, while
younger children are more likely to jump ahead with their (prototypicality-biased)
guess. Taking these data into account, then, it appears that 4-year-olds fit nicely
into an intermediate category between 3- and 5-year-olds, in which they are more
likely to be sensitive to hedge use, but may not have mastered its association with
non-prototypicality yet.
3 Discussion
From age three children are just beginning to take linguistic hedges into account,
and they tend to choose the prototypical object in response to both hedged and un-
hedged cues. Younger children are more likely to rely on length of description as a
cue to category membership: shorter descriptions are interpreted as unmodified and
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hence as referring to a central member of the category. Heider (1971) assumes that
central members of a category are learned earlier and hypothesizes that children
would make more errors on peripheral category members than adults. We believe
that this may explain the higher percent of hesitations found overall with hedged
frames. In this case, identifying the appropriate referent involves mapping the lin-
guistic description to a non-central category member (that the child is likely to be
less familiar with), incurring processing costs that result in greater response delay.
By age 5, children distinguish hedged from unhedged frames in an adult-like
manner. This finding shows that 5-year-olds understand the contribution of this
type of modification. Furthermore, this result supports previous findings on the ac-
quisition of the meaning of almost: only 5-year-olds displayed an adult-like pattern
in the interpretation of the adverb with all types of scales considered in Amaral
(2010). This suggests that at age 5 children have generalized the semantic value of
almost across different syntactic categories. In the present study, age 4 presents a
middle-point for the developmental trend since children this age pair with 3-year-
olds in the forced-choice task, but with 5-year-olds with respect to their pattern of
hesitations.
Frames and frame-like units are relevant in acquisition (e.g. in learning morpho-
logical patterns and in forming syntactic categories, cf. among others Mintz 2003).
However, little is known about the role that frames play in learning semantic cat-
egories, and in particular about the role that hedged frames play in learning about
category structure.
In future studies, we intend to expand this research in two directions. First, we
will analyze the adult baseline, in particular the adults’ sensitivity to differences in
meaning between the two hedges considered in this task. Second, in line with our
interest in the role of hedges in word learning, we intend to investigate how children
use their knowledge of hedges to make inferences about category membership of
unfamiliar objects.
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